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Abstract. It is common in cognitive science to equate computation (and in particular digital 
computation) with information processing. Yet, it is hard to find a comprehensive explicit ac-
count of concrete digital computation in information processing terms. An Information 
Processing account seems like a natural candidate to explain digital computation. But when 
‘information’ comes under scrutiny, this account becomes a less obvious candidate. 
Four interpretations of information are examined here as the basis for an Informa-
tion Processing account of digital computation, namely Shannon information, algorithmic in-
formation, factual information and instructional information. I argue that any plausible ac-
count of concrete computation has to be capable of explaining at least the three key algorith-
mic notions of input, output and procedures. Whilst algorithmic information fares better than 
Shannon information, the most plausible candidate for an Information Processing account is 
instructional information. 
 1  Introduction 
It is often assumed, particularly in cognitive science discourse, that computation can freely be 
described as information processing. The Encyclopedia of Computer Science (1976: p. 647) 
states  that  “information  processing might,  not  inaccurately,  be  defined  as  ’what  computers 
do’”. This definition is put to the test in this paper, dealing with the question whether concrete 
digital computation (i.e., digital computation as it is actualised in physical systems) can be 
adequately explained solely in terms of information processing. 
The resulting Information Processing (IP) account hinges on the particular interpretation of 
information. It can be interpreted semantically (as factual or instructional information) or non-
semantically (e.g., as Shannon information or algorithmic information). To set the stage, the 
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ification or the removal thereof. To a first approximation, this characterisation seems to ac-
cord with the operations of a Turing machine (hereafter, TM) reading from and writing to a 
tape and changing states. Also, intuitively, it seems to describe the practical use of information 
by natural cognitive agents beyond their mere communication of information. 
 As suggested above the focus of the paper is on concrete digital computation rather than 
abstract computability. I argue elsewhere that formalisms of computability (such as TMs or 
the lambda calculus) may indeed provide the mathematical tools required for determining the 
plausibility of computational level theories (in the spirit of David Marr’s  tripartite analysis). 
Yet, it is concrete computation that is most relevant to the study of cognition as a natural phe-
nomenon (Fresco 2011). Since our interest here is in physical computing systems, human-
engineered computing systems such as conventional digital computers and (where applicable) 
discrete neural nets
1
 are used in this paper to exemplify various points. These examples do not 
limit the generality of the arguments put forward. Human-engineered computing systems can 
simply be used as paradigmatic cases of computation. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. I begin in the next section by introducing four possible in-
terpretations of information: Shannon information, algorithmic information, factual informa-
tion and instructional information. Subsequently, in section 3, I examine the resulting IP ac-
counts depending on the interpretation of information adopted and explicate the key require-
ments for a physical system to perform nontrivial digital computation in terms of IP. In sec-
tion 4, I argue that any plausible account of concrete computation has to be up to the task of 
                                                 
1
 Graham White suggested extending the use of the single-input single output transducer paradigm. One way of 
going about it is to refer to computing agents instead (i.e., in terms of goals, goal-triggers and actions to 
achieve these goals). Supposedly, this paradigm would encompass conventional digital computers as well as 
neural nets. After all, neural nets are arguably the paradigmatic case for parallel distributed processing of in-
formation. But this requires significant conceptual groundwork to determine the extent to which computing 
agents are goal-driven rather than rule-driven. Besides, it is an entirely different matter whether all neural 
nets compute, and even if they do, whether they perform nontrivial digital computation. I discuss this last 
question elsewhere (Fresco 2010). 
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explaining at least the three key algorithmic notions of input, output and procedures. I then 
examine some problems for the resulting IP accounts concluding that an account based on al-
gorithmic information fares better than one based on Shannon information. Still, only an IP 
account that is based on instructional information seems to be suitable for the task. Section 5 
proposes a plausible IP account based on instructional information. In section 6, I show how 
this proposed account deals with problems faced by the other interpretations of information. 
 2  Semantic Information, Non-Semantic Information and Data 
The roots of the conflation of information and computation are in the attempt to explain the 
mind in the mid-twentieth century. This venture led to a fusion of information-theoretic lan-
guage, notions of control and TMs. At that time, the information-theoretic language used was 
based on the Shannon/Wiener cybernetic conception of information. The original ambition of 
cybernetics was to explain the behaviour of both living organisms and human-engineered ma-
chines using a unified theory utilising concepts of control and information (Cordeschi 2004: 
p. 186). Norbert Weiner, for instance, defined a machine as “a device for converting incoming 
messages into outgoing messages…. [or] as the engineer would say… [it] is a multiple-input 
multiple-output transducer” (1966: p. 32). Still, in general, the problems under consideration 
were based on single-input single-output transducers without any long-range statistical de-
pendencies of transmitted messages. 
However, our modern concept of information is broader and need not be limited only to 
this cybernetic conception. To some degree, everything can be described in information-
theoretic terms: from the movements of atoms and molecules through economics, politics and 
fine arts to ethics and human nature. So broad is the concept of information, that some read-
ings of information unavoidably lead to pan-informationalism. Moreover, there is now even a 
 4 
dedicated discipline within philosophy devoted to study information, namely the philosophy 
of information (Floridi 2011). 
 Furthermore, some draw a distinction between ‘data’ and ‘information’. The Encyclopedia 
of Computer Science (1976: p. 641) defines data as “physical symbols used to represent in-
formation for storage, communication or processing”.  Information, on the other hand, is de-
fined as “knowledge, especially as it provides people (or machines) with new facts about the 
real world (ibid, italics original). Data apparently are the vehicle that conveys meaningful (or 
semantic) information and could be analysed, for example, by Shannon’s information theory 
(henceforth, SIT) or by algorithmic information theory (hereafter, AIT) discussed below. 
In what follows then, my focus on information is confined to how Information Processing 
pertains to concrete digital computation. But in order to understand how information is 
processed, we first need to understand what is being processed
2
. Four relevant readings of in-
formation, which seem to be potential candidates for an IP account of concrete computation, 
are explored here with a distinction made between semantic and non-semantic information
3
. 
 2.1  Non-semantic information version 1: Shannon information (SI) 
Claude Shannon  (1948:  p.  1)  attempted  to  solve  the  “fundamental  problem of  communica-
tion”: finding the optimal manner by which messages from a source of information are exact-
ly or approximately reproduced at their destination (Piccinini and Scarantino 2011: p. 19). 
According to Wiener (1948: p. 61), one of the simplest unitary forms of information is the re-
cording of a choice between two equiprobable basic alternatives. 
                                                 
2
 The functionalist approach of ignoring the internal constitution of information and only concentrating on its 
processing instead is not so useful in our case. The conceptual analysis undertaken in this paper results in dif-
ferent IP accounts depending on what information is taken to be. It also has implications for the applicability 
of the resulting IP account to concrete computation. 
3
 In a similar vein, Gualtiero Piccinini and Andrea Scarantino analyse three potential candidates for an IP ac-
count: SI, natural semantic information and non-natural semantic information (2011). They conclude that dig-
ital computation does not entail the processing of either SI or natural semantic information and it also need 
not be the processing of non-natural semantic information.   
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 However, SI does not entail any semantic content or meaning. SIT has abstracted from the 
physical media of communication (e.g., the physical composition of the communication chan-
nel) so that any relevant physical constraints can be analysed separately. Shannon provided a 
statistical definition of information as well as general theorems about the theoretical lower 
bounds of bit rates and the capacity of information flow. His theory approaches information 
syntactically: whether and how much (not what) information is conveyed (Floridi 2008: p. 
119). SI is different from the ordinary usage of ‘information’; it tells us nothing about the use-
fulness of or interest in a message. The basic idea is coding messages into a binary (or any 
other) system at the bare minimum number of bits we need to send to get our message across 
in the presence of noise. 
 Even in this sense, the amount of information conveyed is as much a property of our own 
knowledge as anything in the message. If we send the same message twice (a message and its 
copy), the information in the two messages is not the sum of that in each. Rather the informa-
tion only comes from the first one. Receiving a message may change the recipient’s circums-
tance from not knowing what something was to knowing what it is (Feynman 1996: pp. 118-
120). The more possible messages a recipient could have otherwise received, the more “sur-
prised” the recipient is when it gets that particular message. The average amount of uncertain-
ty or surprise of the recipient is also known as informational entropy (Floridi 2009: p. 34).  
 2.2  Non-semantic information version 2: algorithmic information (AI) 
AIT, which was developed by Andrei Kolmogorov, Ray Solomonoff and Gregory Chaitin, 
deals with the informational complexity of data structures (but not with the runtime complexi-
ty of algorithms). It formally defines the complexity or the informational content of a data 
 6 
structure, say, a string, as the length of the shortest self-delimiting program
4
 producing that 
string as output on a Universal TM (UTM) (Chaitin 2003: p. 157, Dunn 2008: p. 590). The AI 
complexity of any computable string (in any particular symbolic representation) is the length 
of the shortest program that computes it on a particular UTM and halts. 
 Moreover, Chaitin proposes thinking of a computing system as a decoding device at the 
receiving end of a noiseless binary communications channel (2003: p. 157). Its programs are 
thought of as code words and the output of the computation as the decoded message. The pro-
grams  then  form what  is  called  a  ‘prefix-free’  set  so  that  successive messages  (e.g.,  proce-
dures) sent across the channel can be distinguished from one another. Still, he acknowledges 
that AI has precisely the formal properties of the entropy of SI. 
AI may be deemed a competing notion of SI by allowing us to assign complexity values to 
individual strings and other data types. Whilst SIT analyses the amount of information of a 
message relative to a group of messages, AIT analyses the complexity of a string as a single 
message (Adriaans 2008: p. 149). The relative frequency of the message (which is the focus 
of former theory) has no special import. The length of the shortest program producing this 
message is minimal within an additive constant that encapsulates the size of the particular 
UTM
5
 representing the amount of information in that message (Calude et al, forthcoming). 
 2.3  Semantic information 
                                                 
4
 The domain of each UTM is self-delimited much like programming languages. For they provide constructs that 
delimit the start and end of programs. A self-delimiting TM does not  “know”  in advance how many  input 
symbols suffice to execute the computation (Calude 2002: pp. 34-35). 
5
 UTMs differ in implementation resulting in the informative content of a string being relative to the particular 
UTM used to calculate its AI complexity, K. Cristian Calude shows that for every two UTMs u1 and u2 $x&c: 
(xŒS, cŒN) |Ku1(x) - Ku2(x)| ≤ c where x is the input to the UTM (and S is the set of all strings) (2002: p. 38).  
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The most common informal analysis of semantic information over the last three decades cha-
racterised it in terms of data + meaning (Floridi 2005: pp. 351-359). According to this analy-
sis, an object O is an instance of semantic information iff:  
1. O consists of N data (for positive integer N), i.e., information cannot exist without da-
ta. For instance, a database search query that returns a negative answer, such as ‘no en-
tries  found’, yields some other positive data through either explicit negative data or 
some metadata about the search query. 
2. The data are well formed. Semantic information depends on the occurrence of both 
syntactically well-formed patterns of data and physically implementable differences.  
3. The data are meaningful
6
. The question here is whether data conveying semantic in-
formation can be rightly described as being meaningful independently of the recipient. 
The resulting account of semantic information clearly depends on the particular interpreta-
tion of data. As noted above, the standard way to interpret data is as physical symbols used to 
represent information. But this results in a (non-vicious) circular definition. In response, Lu-
ciano Floridi proposes a somewhat different definition of data that does not explicitly refer to 
information (2011: pp. 85-86). Datum d is defined in terms of uninterpreted variables that are 
distinct from one another in a domain that is left open to further interpretation. The actual 
format, medium and language in which semantic information is encoded may remain unspeci-
fied in the general case. Information may be expressed verbally, pictorially and using arbitra-
rily different languages. 
Yet, the standard analysis of semantic information is arguably insufficient, as it does not re-
quire that semantic information be veridical. Meaningful and well-formed data still qualify as 
                                                 
6
 This principle tacitly assumes the existence (even in the past) of some agent with a system of values relative to 
whom the data are (or were) meaningful. 
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semantic information, regardless of whether they represent or convey a truth. Thus, on the 
standard analysis, misinformation, disinformation and tautologies all count as genuine types 
of semantic information (Floridi 2005: pp. 359-360; Dretske 1981: pp. 44-45). According to 
the Veridicality thesis, semantic information must be truthful. It has to represent true contents 
about the referred object, event, topic or state of affairs. So, the standard analysis has to be 
modified to also include the requirement that the data be truthful (Floridi 2005: pp. 365-366). 
On the one hand, the first type of semantic information, factual information, represents 
facts or states of affairs and only qualifies as information if it is true. Some philosophers (in-
cluding Dretske 1981, Barwise and Seligman 1997, Floridi 2009, 2011) have argued for the 
alethic (i.e., truth-based) nature of factual information, whereas others (including Carnap and 
Bar-Hillel 1952, Fetzer 2004, Scarantino and Piccinini 2010) have argued that it need not be 
truthful. Roughly speaking, those who argue for the alethic nature of factual information, also 
assert that it is only true factual information that yields knowledge and reject misinformation 
and disinformation as genuine types of information. And those arguing against the veridicality 
of factual information also agree that meaningful and well-formed data already qualify as in-
formation, regardless of being true or false. 
The debate about whether semantic information indeed must be truthful remains unsettled. 
Some philosophers (most notably, Rudolf Carnap and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel) argued against the 
veridicality of semantic information. Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) characterise the semantic 
information in a sentence (or proposition) S in terms of a logical probability space and the in-
verse relation between information and the probability of S. It is generally accepted that tau-
tologies convey 0 information for they have an “absolute logical probability” (ibid: p.2) of 1 
(Floridi 2011: p. 99). However, when considering contradictions, whose probability is 0, they 
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supposedly contain the maximal semantic information content for the very same reason (Car-
nap and Bar-Hillel 1952: pp. 7-8; Floridi 2009: p. 44)
7
. According to Carnap and Bar-Hillel 
(1952: p. 8), this consequence is not problematic, since on their view, semantic information 
does not imply truth. A false proposition could be highly informative in their pragmatic sense. 
However, this claim is highly contestable and leads to some paradoxical results. 
On the other hand, instructional information (the second type of semantic information) 
seems to be a more appropriate candidate for an IP account of computation. The first three 
standard principles of semantic information are sufficient for instructional information. This 
information is not about some fact or state of affairs, so it cannot be correctly qualified as true 
or false. Still, it can be related to descriptive information, such as declaring a variable of a cer-
tain type in computer programming. It is meant to help produce some state of affairs. An in-
struction manual for a washing machine contains instructional information (either imperative-
ly or conditionally) to help produce the expected result of clean clothes. This information is 
not conveyed factually, but rather either imperatively (step 1: do this, step 2: do that, etc.) or 
conditionally (if X do this, otherwise do that). The operation of logic gates of a computer, for 
instance, can be described in terms of conditional logic instructions for channeling the gates’ 
electric voltages. 
 3  The Resulting IP Accounts Based on the Different Interpretations of Information 
An SI-based IP account is, at best, limited in its ability to explain discrete deterministic com-
putation in physical systems. Such an account clearly has some merit for explaining concrete 
computation. SIT emphasises the role of symbol structures as designating a particular state of 
affairs out of some larger set of possible states (i.e., selective information) (Ralston 1976: p. 
                                                 
7
 This counterintuitive consequence is known as the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox (Floridi 2011: p. 100). 
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647). SI is fundamentally a non-actualist conception of information, for it considers the actual 
world as simply one of many other possible worlds
8
. Accordingly, the actual message trans-
mitted is just one of many other possible messages. To a great degree, conventional digital 
computers are non-actualists, in the sense that they are designed to resist minor perturbations 
(e.g., noise) and respond to a broad class of inputs. The non-actualist character of digital com-
puting systems suggests some compatibility between them and SI. 
Indeed, the selective characteristic of SI is compatible with a particular control structure al-
lowing programmable computing systems remarkable flexibility. Selective information is 
closely connected with the way in which digital computers are capable of performing a condi-
tional branch. This operation detects which of several different states obtains (e.g., what input 
was entered or which symbol was last scanned by the TM) and then sends the computation 
along different paths accordingly. The use of selective information by conditional branch 
processes lies at the heart of everything complex that digital computers do (ibid). 
Furthermore, hardware malfunctions in deterministic computing systems could be de-
scribed as noise in discrete communication channels. SIT deals with those aspects of commu-
nication where a transmitted signal is perturbed by noise during transmission. The received 
signal is then analysed as a function of the transmitted signal and a probabilistic noise varia-
ble (Shannon 1948: pp. 20-25). When considering a miscomputation, which is the result of 
some hardware malfunction, as a malformed signal, an analysis of it in terms of SI processing 
can be useful
9. The computer’s memory  registers,  for  instance, are designed to handle such 
                                                 
8
 This is consistent with the possibilist’s thesis (in the metaphysics of modality) that the set of all actual things is 
only a subset all of the things that are (possible). 
9
 To a first approximation, a miscomputation is a mistake in the computation process due to a hardware malfunc-
tion or a runtime error of the executed program. A runtime error is typically the result of mistakes made by 
the programmers or designers of the program producing an incorrect or unexpected behaviour at runtime. 
Less common are errors that are caused by compilers producing an incorrect code (but even those can be at-
 11 
noise by including error correction mechanisms using parity bits, information redundancy etc. 
An even more obvious example is a discrete neural net one of whose units has lost the ability 
to transmit and/or receive signals to/from some neighbouring units. Such a scenario can be 
analysed in terms of noise and the channel’s capacity to send and receive messages.  
Yet, SI is a probabilistic concept whereas digital computation may be either deterministic 
or not deterministic (e.g., probabilistic computation, pseudo-random computation etc.). The 
description of a physical system in terms of SI is only adequate if it is memoryless (i.e., if the 
system’s transition to state Sj+1 is unrelated to its last state Sj). But this is typically not the case 
for most conventional digital computing systems, which are deterministic, for their behaviour 
is repeatable and systematic. A dry run of a deterministic algorithm (using some test data) sys-
tematically yields the same output when its input and initial state remain unchanged. Similar-
ly, the activity across the intermediate layers in a feedforward neural net is determined by the 
connection weights among units and the units’ threshold functions. 
Still, it is important to note that to some extent, when subject to noise even so-called physi-
cal deterministic computing systems are actually not deterministic. For there is an element of 
uncertainty introduced by a possible malfunction of any of  the  system’s  components. Most 
modern digital computers (e.g., particularly those based on multiprocessor or multicore archi-
tectures) regularly perform multitasking (leading to interaction among processes or among 
threads within processes). And this makes it very difficult to regard the execution of any sin-
gle program strictly as a conventional single-tape, single-head TM, for a single program may 
include multiple threads blurring the classical division of computational labour among se-
                                                                                                                                                        
tributed to human errors in the complier program). Common examples of runtime errors include the program 
running out of available memory, attempting to divide by 0, accessing illegal memory locations (e.g., when 
attempting to read past the last cell of a data array), or dereferencing a NULL pointer, which no longer points 
to a valid memory location. 
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quential procedures. As well, the multiprocessing (or multithreading) approach is susceptible 
to performance problems due to unpredictable delays while processes (or threads) are within 
critical sections.  
Moreover, these possible delays may make the results of the overall computation unpre-
dictable. Some of these unpredictable delays could be the result of caching or paged memory 
management, which are under the control of the computer’s operating system (hereafter, OS) 
with support from the hardware. These delays could also be the result of the “external” envi-
ronment, such as external devices (e.g., a mouse, keyboard, USB flash drive, etc.) or commu-
nication lines to other computing systems (e.g., through modems, old serial ports or Bluetooth 
enabled devices). And even low-level programming languages (most notably, assembler), 
which have some access to the hardware level, cannot deal with such (external) noise (through 
error recovery mechanisms) (White 2011: pp. 192-195). Besides, even in the absence of ex-
ternal noise, it is impractical to enumerate all the possible paths through a large non-trivial 
program (Gruenberger 1976: p. 189). This suggests that deterministic computer programs too 
are only deterministic to some degree of idealisation. 
Whilst the state-transitions of Shannon's communication model are probabilistic, the transi-
tion probabilities of a deterministic TM are all set to 1. For every possible input (and a given 
initial state), there is only one possible state into which the TM transitions (Broderick 2004: p. 
8). As Alan Turing stated “given the initial state of the machine and the input signals it is al-
ways possible to predict all future states” (1950: p. 440). Every future state transition can be 
accurately predicted by simulating the program being executed. So, in the case of idealised 
TMs, there is no element of uncertainty or surprise, on which SI is based. But in the case of 
conventional digital computers, which are susceptible to noise (at both the software and the 
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hardware levels), an SI-based IP account may be useful in describing such (potential) adverse 
effects on (otherwise) deterministic computations. 
 Nevertheless, an SI-based IP account can only tell us what the lower bounds are for any 
solution to a given computational problem. SIT provides mathematical measures to calculate 
the lower bounds of information flow along a channel. It can tell us that a solution to a given 
problem cannot be computed in less than n bits of information. But an SI-based analysis can-
not distinguish between two equally small circuits or different optimal programs that solve the 
same problem (and there are infinitely many such programs). 
 AIT, on the other hand, can distinguish among different optimal programs that solve a spe-
cific problem. In principle, the set of all such possible optimal programs is enumerable (Ca-
lude 2009: p. 82). And the full description of each one of these enumerated programs could be 
provided. However, traditional AIT can only approximate the complexity of a string relative 
to a particular UTM and this prevents us from actually having a full description of all the op-
timal programs producing that string (Calude et al, forthcoming). Still, a variation on tradi-
tional AIT, which is not based on UTMs, allows us to compute the complexity of strings (or 
the exact length of these optimal programs), but this comes at a cost. 
 Finite State Transducer AIT (henceforth, FSTAIT) relies on finite transducers for which the 
universality theorem
10
 is false. A transducer, in this context, is a finite state automaton with 
outputs. It can be described as the 6-tuple (Q, Ʃ , Γ, q0, QF, E), where Q is the finite set of 
states, Ʃ  and Γ are the finite sets of input and output symbols respectively, q0 ∈ Q is the initial 
state, QF ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states and E is the finite set of transitions (ibid). Since 
                                                 
10
 This theorem states that there exists a self-delimiting UTM U, such that for every self-delimiting TM T, a con-
stant c can be computed (depending only on U and T), satisfying the following property. If T(x) halts, then 
U(x’) = T(x), for some string x’ whose length is no longer than the length of the string x plus c (Calude 2009: 
p. 81). 
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there is no universal transducer, FSTAIT cannot achieve universality
11
. At the same time, the 
finite state complexity of a string explicitly includes the size of the particular transducer run-
ning the program and this complexity becomes computable (whereas traditional AI complexi-
ty can only be approximated). For our purposes, this means not only that different optimal 
programs are enumerable, but also that they are distinguishable from one another. 
Furthermore, some aspects of the implementing machine are also taken into account by 
AIT. The machine’s size is included as part of the encoded length of the computed string (ib-
id). When AIT examines which problems can be solved, a particular self-delimiting UTM is 
considered (or a specific combination of finite transducers for FSTAIT). This UTM could be 
based, for example, on a register machine with a finite number of registers (Calude 2009: pp. 
82-83). The possible instructions of the program would also be considered, such as:  
1. EQ R1 R2 R3 (if-then-else conditional instruction) 
2. SET R1 R2 
3. ADD R1 R2 
4. READ R1 
5. HALT 
In the light of the above considerations, an AI-based IP account seems to do better than an SI-
based account in explaining some physical aspects of computing systems as well as the set of 
instructions driving the computation. 
Moreover, in a manner similar to SI, AI complexity is a non-actualist conception of infor-
mation. In accordance with the universality theorem, any program in some computer language 
can be converted (or compiled) into a program running on a UTM. There is some algorithmic 
                                                 
11
 There is no finite generalised transducer that can simulate a transducer running some program  Yet, Calude et 
al (forthcoming) prove that the invariance theorem (informally saying that a UTM provides an optimal means 
of description up to an additive constant) also holds true for finite state complexity. Finite state complexity of 
a finite string x is defined in terms of a finite transducer T and a finite string s such that T on input s outputs 
x. It is defined relative to the number of states of transducers used for minimal encodings of arbitrary strings. 
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procedure for passing among the possible enumerated TMs that compute a function f. To that 
end, we can pretend that we have all these enumerated TMs in front of us. If, for instance, we 
need to compute 20 steps in the computation of the 5
th
 machine on input string “slam dunk”, 
then we simply pick the 5
th
 machine,  put  “slam  dunk”  on  its  tape  and  run  it  for  20  steps 
(Downey and Hirschfeldt 2010: p. 9).  
In order to assign AI complexity to the configuration of some computing system (both the 
machine and the self-delimiting program it simulates), the system is “frozen” at some point in 
time. That snapshot of the actual computation taking place (rather than all possible counter-
factual computations) is assigned an AI complexity value. Still, since all the enumerated TMs 
for computing f are available in principle, the AI complexity analysis is not strictly limited 
just to the actual computation that is executed. 
As for the resulting IP account that is based on semantic information, its basis could be ei-
ther factual or instructional information. If we take semantic information to be factual, then 
any processing of information is both representational and truth preserving. Symbolic repre-
sentations (or sub-symbolic representations in neural nets), which are processed by the com-
puting system, supposedly carry true information about some (possibly external) state of af-
fairs. The preservation of the isomorphic mapping between these representations and the state 
of affairs in question requires that their processing be truth preserving. Unlike SI and AI, fac-
tual information is a thoroughly actualist conception. It refers to situations that either have 
been actualised or are actualising in the world. A factual assertion commits the asserter not to 
its truth in some possible world but in the actual world. It seems then that processing of fac-
tual information and concrete computation are incompatible, for the latter is non-actualist. 
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This incompatibility raises a problem in regard to concrete computation in human-
engineered systems. A digital computing system allows all the possible computations, which 
the system could have performed, rather than just the one it actually performs (this point is 
used to block Searle-like trivialisation of computation and is discussed at some length in Fres-
co 2011). So if we opt to explain the working of the computing system in terms of information 
processing, then the explanans should be given by the relation between that system and the 
world in all possible worlds in which the computation may actualise. Still, an IP account 
based on factual information can only explain one particular scenario of computation, namely 
the one actualising in the real world. 
On the other hand, an IP account based on instructional information seems less problemat-
ic. The processed information is not characterised as true or false. A program executed on a 
conventional digital computer could be interpreted as the execution of instructional informa-
tion (e.g., assign the value ‘3’ to variable var1, do X if Y, otherwise halt; where X stands for 
an instruction and Y is the condition). Similarly, the working of a neural net can be explained 
in terms of instructional information. The local rules of  the individual units’  threshold func-
tions are explicable by conditional information (e.g., if the summed input is greater than 0, 
then fire, otherwise remain inactive). The interconnection weights are explicable by impera-
tive information (e.g., assign the value ‘2’ to the connection between units X1 and Y2). 
Furthermore, the underlying hardware of the computing system could be described as the 
flow of electricity through its logic gates yielding its discrete state-transitions (when they sta-
bilise). Computer programs  and  hardware  are  based  on  algebraic  rules  in which  ‘true’  and 
‘false’ simply correspond to 1 and 0 respectively. Conspicuously, logic gates are implemented 
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as electronic switches whose entire operation is based on manipulating electrical voltages 
representing the binary states 0 and 1 (e.g., 0V and 5V representing 0 and 1 respectively). 
Additionally, instructional information is not limited to describing actual computations on-
ly. The informational content of a program is given by its behaviour on all possible in-
puts, rather than just on actual inputs. UTMs (and similarly conventional digital computers) 
may take the same vehicles (be that strings, numerals or anything else) as either instructions 
or data that are operated upon according to some instructions. The very same string may play 
the role of an instruction in one run of the program and data in another (Scarantino and Picci-
nini 2010: p. 326). The same string may even be both an instruction and data during a single 
run of a program. Instructional information is certainly compatible with this principle. 
There is nothing in the definition of instructional information that implies that it only 
applies to actual occurrences, for it is not evaluated alethically. 
 In sum, the four different interpretations of information give rise to different IP accounts of 
computation each of which can explain certain aspects of concrete computation. Section four 
specifically examines the particular problems that each resulting account faces. But before we 
can settle on a specific IP account as being adequate, the next section examines the key re-
quirements implied by each resulting IP account. 
 3.1  The Key Requirements Implied by the Resulting IP Account 
The key requirements for a physical system to perform nontrivial digital computation
12
 im-
plied by any IP account are fourfold: 1. having the capacity to send information, 2. having the 
                                                 
12
 One might question the reasoning behind the key requirements coming from the resulting IP account, rather 
than coming from actual computing systems. Once these key requirements are explicated, then various inter-
pretations of information can be evaluated as a basis for an IP account. But that would be missing the point, 
for it is not at all clear what it takes for a physical system to compute. This is also the reason for the existence 
of many extensionally different accounts of computation (Fresco 2011). The IP account is only one of them, 
and it is commonly invoked in cognitive science. 
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capacity to receive information, 3. having the capacity to store and retrieve information, 4. 
having the capacity to process information. The fourth key requirement is affected by the par-
ticular interpretation of information (as is shown below). Importantly, whilst not strictly im-
plied by the four interpretations of information, a fifth requirement is needed to exclude sys-
tems that only perform trivial computations. This requirement is having the capacity to actual-
ise control information
13
. For simplicity, the following discussion remains neutral on the spe-
cific interpretation of information, unless specified otherwise. 
 The first key requirement implied by any resulting IP account is the system having 
the capacity to send information. The sender prepares the messages to be sent to the receiver 
and encodes them for transmission. An important distinction that should be drawn in the con-
text of digital computing systems is between sending information internally amongst different 
components of the same system and externally between the system and some external inter-
face (e.g., an input/output device or another computing system). A computing system devoid 
of any external interfaces may still compute a solution to some predefined problem. An ex-
ample of sending information internally is the computer’s main memory being the source of 
information (e.g., a stored instruction). The memory controller acting as the sender is respon-
sible for fetching data from the main memory and transmitting them to the CPU. Similarly, 
the tape of a TM can be regarded as the source of information when its head (acting as the 
“sender”) reads a symbol from the tape. 
Moreover, at times a digital computing system acts both as a sender and a receiver. One 
example is the units of a discrete neural net. Any unit in the input layer receives information 
from another system (or possibly through some feedback loop in the net) and sends informa-
                                                 
13
 At the same time, this requirement makes it less obvious how discrete connectionist networks perform digital 
computation in the absence of explicit control units. This complication shall not be further considered here. 
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tion to one or more units in the subsequent level (and conversely for the output units). Any 
unit in the intermediate layers receives information from at least one other unit in the preced-
ing layer and sends information (assuming its threshold function was met) to the units con-
nected to it at the next level. Similarly, a transmission of information internally can take place 
between  two  programs  running  on  a  computer  or  between  the  computer’s  memory  (the 
source) and the CPU (the destination). 
 Analogously, the second key requirement implied by any resulting IP account is the system 
having the capacity to receive information. But in the context of computing systems, this re-
quirement needs to be relaxed a bit. If the former requirement necessitated a sender to trans-
mit the message, this requirement expects a receiver on the other end to accept it, at least in 
principle. In some cases, the absence of a receiver on the other end means that the computa-
tion remains unexecuted (or in a suspended mode). For instance, a program thread (the send-
er), which sends an input/output signal to the OS (acting as the receiver), will enter the sus-
pended mode until its I/O request is acknowledged. But whereas a sender is needed to trans-
mit the information, there are cases where the absence of a receiver does not result in an in-
complete computation. This is particularly common in inter-computer communication, but 
applies to individual computing systems just the same. 
 One example is certain communication protocols invoked amongst various computing sys-
tems and another is some units of a neural net acting as senders without receivers. Some 
communication protocols such as TCP, which is at the heart of all HTTP-based Internet trans-
actions, require a “handshake” between the sender and the receiver  for the transaction to be 
successful  (e.g.,  consider  the “Server not found” error message displayed when a particular 
website cannot be reached). But other protocols such as UDP (User Datagram Protocol) do 
 20 
not require that the receiver acknowledge the receipt of the message sent (and are less relia-
ble, but faster). Moreover, in feedforward networks it is possible that some particular units 
will act as receivers (or senders) but not as senders (or receivers) when the connections to 
other units become inactive. Although this may affect some local operations, the overall oper-
ation of the neural net as a whole may still be completed successfully. 
Also, any resulting IP account typically requires a sender and a receiver that are well coor-
dinated. Unlike a microphone acting as a sender of information even in the absence of a re-
ceiver (the audience), in computing systems senders and receivers are typically well coordi-
nated. The information contained in a message may indeed not depend on the receiver’s learn-
ing something from it, or even being able to decode it (Drestke 1981: p. 57). But if the receiv-
er is unable to decode the message in a computing system, the computation will be either in-
complete or incorrect (when considering cases where both the sender and receiver are internal 
to the computing system). 
Suppose that the CPU (the receiver) does not correctly decode the instruction from the 
main control unit (the sender). This could be the result of noise on the channel (e.g., a hard-
ware malfunction of some sort) or lack of synchronisation between the main control unit and 
the CPU. And if the error is not corrected, the execution of the instruction will fail, thus hin-
dering the overall computation. However, in other cases, such as when using the UDP proto-
col discussed above, senders and receivers are not necessarily well coordinated. While this 
option may be useful for time-sensitive programs, it is unlikely to be an option for real-time 
systems requiring high-reliability of the data transferred. 
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 The third key requirement implied by any resulting IP account is the system having the ca-
pacity to store and retrieve information
14
. The storage and retrieval of information in a com-
puting system are well synchronised, as one always presupposes the other. Without the system 
having the ability to retrieve data, there is clearly very little sense to storing data in the first 
place. For instance, if the OS were stored in the computer’s RAM (random access memory) 
instead of on the hard-drive or some other persistent memory medium (where it was ex-
pected), the computer would fail to start following a reboot
15
. The computer’s RAM is a vola-
tile memory, which retains data only as long as it has a power supply available. So that the 
computer can load its OS, the OS has to be stored on some persistent memory medium (e.g., 
hard-drive, read-only memory or flash memory). Otherwise, the result will not be a miscom-
putation, but rather the absence of any computation
16
. 
 Lastly, the fourth key requirement implied by the IP account is the system having the ca-
pacity to process information. This requirement is the essence of information processing. It is 
also the most problematic one and it becomes even more stringent when information is inter-
preted as factual information. It is important to emphasise that processing information does 
not merely amount to encoding and decoding information. Those are methods that typically 
preserve the information while converting it into a coded form and vice versa. Processing of 
information should not be simply equated with transformation of information either. While 
transformation may be the modification or removal of (some) information, it does not imply 
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 This requirement is problematic for most neural networks, for they typically lack the flexibility enabled by 
long-term memory. That is particularly problematic for nets lacking any feedback loops. 
15
 It does not follow though that some working OS threads (or even the OS in its entirety) be loaded onto RAM 
once the OS has finished loading from the persistent memory.  
16
 In conventional general-purpose computers the OS is the core program required for any other program to run. 
But if neither the OS (as the main executed program) nor any other program (by implication) is running on the 
computer, then effectively no computation is taking place.  
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the production of new information. Transformation (of information) implies a prior form (of 
information) changing to another form. 
 To avoid ambiguity, processing of information is characterised here as the production of 
new information, modification of information or its removal
17
. The production of new infor-
mation, such as a new database table containing salaries of employees
18
, may be the deriva-
tion of new propositions from existing ones. The modification of existing information, such as 
giving some employees a pay rise, is the manipulation of some information I1 such that I1≠I2 
(where I2 is I1 that is modified at Tn+1). The removal of information, such as deleting from the 
system matching records of employees, who left the company, is a selective removal of in-
formation that need not result in the deletion of the entire system. 
 Additionally, construing deterministic computation as information processing requires 
more than the communication of information in a non-deterministic manner. Computers en-
code, decode and transmit information (and so do telephones), but they also perform tasks 
with inferential import (when trying to divide a number by 0, a good program should yield an 
error message from the computing system). This requires a way of distinguishing the differ-
ences between the informational contents of the messages (i.e., the specific information these 
messages carry or their semantic content). SIT provides the procedures for selecting messag-
es, but not to distinguish between their informational contents (Dretske 1981: p. 6). 
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 Information processing may be construed in a variety of ways depending on the particular context of enquiry, 
including (but not limited to) the manipulation, acquisition, parsing, derivation, storing, comparison and 
analysis of information. However, it seems to me that these depend crucially on at least one of the aforemen-
tioned operations. Also, insofar as processing of information is taken as a physical process, in accordance 
with the second law of thermodynamics, it always results in some change in free energy (Karnani et al. 
2009). Thus, even when certain information is deleted from a computing system, it is not completely de-
stroyed, for some energy dissipates from the system into its surrounding. 
18
 Yet, it remains to be seen whether this new information stored in the database of a digital computing system is 
merely a copy of the (new) information that was created externally (e.g., by the human resources manager). 
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 This ability to distinguish between different contents is necessary for modifying or adding 
new justified information. SIT tells us about the probabilities associated with symbols from a 
given language, but it is indifferent to the content of the messages. For instance, the following 
strings S1 and S2 have the same length (including that of their symbol constituents). S1=“All 
cars have  four wheels”; S2= “All  cats  have  four ankles”. Let  us  suppose  that S1 and S2 are 
equiprobable (so according to SIT, they are potentially equally informative). Let S3 be “Bum-
blebee  is a car”. By using Universal  Instantiation and Modus Ponens (taking these as being 
represented in first-order predicate logic), one can infer some new justified information
19
. 
For example, one can infer S4= “Bumblebee has four wheels” from S1 and S3. The overall 
informative content of any two (different) strings combined is typically greater than that of 
each one of these strings individually
20
. This new information must also be true, if S1 and S3 
are true. It tells us something else about Bumblebee (namely that Bumblebee has four 
wheels). S2 and S3, however, do not yield new justified information using Universal Instantia-
tion (and Modus Ponens, similar to S4). One cannot validly infer any new singular statement 
about Bumblebee from the universal statement S2. In order to apply rules of logic as a means 
of producing new true information, the symbolic constituents of strings must be distinguisha-
ble. But according to SIT, we may encode and transmit S2 (rather than S1) and S3 to the reci-
pient (as S1 and S2 are equiprobable) that learns nothing new from S2 and S3 in this case. 
                                                 
19
 There is an ongoing debate regarding information in deductive inferences. Some, including John S. Mill and 
the logical positivists, have argued that logical truths are tautologies, and so deductive reasoning does not add 
any new information. On this view, all valid deductive arguments simply beg the question. Others (notably, 
Jaakko Hintikka 1984) have argued that deductive reasoning can indeed produce new non-trivial information. 
20
 Generally, the amount of information in any two strings Si and Sj is not less than the sum of the information of 
Si and Sj, if the content of Si and the content of Sj are in some sense independent (or at least one does not 
contain the other). Still, there are clearly cases where INF(Si + Sj) > INF(Si) + INF(Sj). For a more detailed 
discussion of the “additivity” principle see Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952: pp. 12-13). Arguably, Universal In-
stantiation and Modus Ponens, for instance, as a means of inferring S4 from S1 and S3 also carry some positive 
information, since without the recipient knowing how to use them, she cannot infer S4. 
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 Furthermore, when information is construed as factual information its processing require-
ment becomes even more stringent. The syntactical manipulation of messages must be done in 
a manner that preserves their semantics. Typically, rules that are applied in the processing op-
eration must be truth preserving
21
. At the very least, new justified information has to be con-
sistent with prior existing factual information. If conjunction, for instance, is applied to pro-
duce new justified information, then the conjuncts C1 and C2 must be neither contradictories 
nor contraries. Otherwise, their conjunction C1 ® C2 would be false (thus, non-factual). 
 A database-driven computing system that progressively produces new information is a 
good example. Consider a system, whose database is initially populated with some basic 
propositions, designed to progressively increase the overall information based on these initial 
propositions. If the information processed by the system is taken to be factual (and hence 
true), then the resulting new information must be true as well. The system could progressively 
produce more information by means of logical inferences. For instance, if propositions P and 
Q were entered initially, then the system could produce the new proposition (P ® Q) and add it 
as a new entry in the database. Intuitively, the more propositions there are in the database, the 
more informative it becomes. But this requires that the system be capable of determining 
which propositions are true and which are false. Otherwise, inconsistencies and tautologies 
will eventually creep into the database, thereby decreasing its overall informative content. 
Whilst the aforementioned requirements apply to many information-processing systems, 
they are insufficient for excluding some systems that only perform trivial computations. A 
fifth requirement is thus needed to exclude those systems. Arguably, basic logic gates send, 
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 Induction, abduction and non-monotonic logic do not abide by the same principle, and their application does 
not guarantee the truth of any new information that they potentially produce. Both abductive reasoning and 
non-monotonic logic play an important role in artificial intelligence and should not be discounted, but they 




 information. Flip-flops and shift registers can also store information. 
However, such systems perform only trivial digital computation. Let us grant that any com-
ponent that takes one or more lines of input and produces a single output (of the same type), 
which stands in a definite logical relation to its input(s), may be described as a basic logic 
gate. Then logic gates can be built using water, instead of electricity, to activate the gating 
function. A hydraulic OR gate, for example, can be built by merging two water pipes. This 
gate trivially computes the logical OR function. Still, it seems excessive to classify such a 
gate as a digital computing system proper. 
What basic logic gates, flip-flops and shift registers lack is a control unit. Put another way, 
in an information-theoretic language, digital computing systems proper have the capacity to 
actualise control information. Logic gates and flip-flops can be wired together to form com-
puting systems, whose computations can be logically analysed into the operations performed 
by their components. This is, after all, how finite state machines are built. Nevertheless, not 
every collection of entities, even provided that they may be described in isolation as logic 
gates, can be connected together to form a digital computing system. The inputs and outputs 
of logic gates are typically of the same type, so that outputs from one gate can be transmitted 
as inputs to other gates. The components must also be appropriately organised, synchronised 
(Piccinini 2007: pp. 522-523) and include some controller unit(s).  
 Specifically, control information in the context of digital computing systems is characte-
rised as the capacity to control the acquisition and utilisation of information to produce a de-
finitive action
23
. Accordingly, control information is distinguished functionally from the 
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 The reader will have noticed that I have deliberately used ‘transform’ here, rather than ‘process’. For informa-
tion processing (but not its transformation) also implies the (possible) production of new information. 
23
 This characterisation is an adaptation of Peter Corning’s teleonomic definition of control information in cyber-
netic and biological systems (2001: p. 1277). 
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process of exercising control (Corning 2001: p. 1276) and it may only exist in potentia until 
the system actually uses it. Control information is always relational and context dependent 
and it does not exist independently of the computing process. Further, it has no fixed structure 
or value – a single binary bit may be sufficient for producing a definitive action (ibid: p. 
1279), say, by expressing a stop or continue command.  
Furthermore, control information is content-based and this affects its relation to the four in-
terpretations of information. It is excluded from SI, since SIT ignores informational content. 
AIT, on the other hand, in grounding informational analysis on UTMs (or any other control 
mechanism) at the very least implicitly assumes control information. Still, it is instructional 
information that is most compatible with control information, for “a program is literally a de-
scription of what the controller [does] at run-time” (Larsson and Lüders 2004: p. 5). 
 Moreover, to ground ‘control information’ in the context of computing systems, let us con-
sider the following cases. A numerical opcode in computer machine language represents the 
primitive operations supported by the particular computer architecture, say, an ADD opera-
tion. To execute this operation, the CPU follows the opcode direction to the physical address 
of the ADD operation. ADD is coded by a unique binary pattern and whenever this particular 
sequence lands in the CPU’s instruction register, it is akin to a dialled telephone number that 
mechanically opens up the lines to the right special-purpose circuit (Dennett 1991: p. 214).  
The controller receives the part of the instruction that encodes a command (such as addi-
tion, multiplication, storing a value in register R1, etc.). This command (i.e., the control in-
formation) is used by the controller to determine which operation needs to be performed on 
the corresponding data that are subsequently sent to another component for execution. Like-
wise, (though in an idealised manner) a TM is controlled by a finite-state controller and at 
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each step of the computation, the combination of the symbol read from the tape and the state 
of the TM determines its next operation. The control information of the TM is its m-
configuration that specifies which instruction is to be followed next. 
Control information is also used in network communication, whereas basic logic gates, 
shift registers and the likes are deprived of it. Control information is exchanged, for instance, 
between network routers for making routing decisions about sent messages. Further, to estab-
lish reliable communication lines and allow error recovery, control information (e.g., unique 
network address identifiers) is sent and collected. However, while basic logic gates, flip-flops 
and shift registers may be senders, receivers and transformers of information, they lack the 
capacity to actualise control information even if they happen to transform it during their oper-
ation. Consequently, whilst digital computing systems proper exhibit the capacity to actualise 
control information, trivial computing systems (e.g., basic logic gates) do not. 
 4  Problems For the Resulting IP Account 
 4.1  Effective computability as a guiding principle 
Essentially, any account of concrete computation has to be able to explain at least the three 
key algorithmic notions of input, output and procedures. To begin with, any plausible account 
of computation has to be able to explain effective computability (whether in terms of TMs or 
not). Turing’s  analysis, for one, showed that instruction-following operations of a human 
computor could be simulated by TMs. His analysis identified effectively calculable functions 
with Turing-computable functions (Dershowitz and Gurevich 2008: p. 304).  
 Further,  the  subject matter of Turing’s  analysis  is  computability unlike  the other  formal-
isms of computability (Soare 2007: p. 706). His analysis studied what functions could be 
computed by a finite procedure. Whilst the other formalisms, such as Church’s lambda calcu-
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lus, Gödel’s  recursive  functions and Post systems, are provably extensionally equivalent to 
Turing’s,  their subject matter  is λ-definability, recursion and canonical systems respectively, 
rather than computability directly. Turing was the first to provide a convincing definition of 
both a computable function and a UTM. 
Also, in practice, Turing computability lays the ground rules for all existing digital com-
puters as well as for all programming languages. Most modern programming languages (e.g., 
Ada, C, C++, Java, Lisp, Pascal etc.) are Turing complete, since (if equipped with unbounded 
memory) their syntax allows them to simulate any TM. The other formalisms (e.g. the lambda 
calculus) inevitably lead to a similar result too. All sequential functional programming lan-
guages, for instance, can be understood in terms of the lambda calculus, as it provides the ba-
sic mechanisms for the nesting of procedures. Incidentally, Alonzo Church stated that defining 
“effectiveness as computability by an arbitrary machine, subject  to restrictions of finiteness, 
would seem an adequate representation of the ordinary notion” (as cited by Dershowitz and 
Gurevich 2008: p. 303). So any explanation of the operation of a digital computer or a com-
puter program is underpinned by effective computability at some level of abstraction. 
Moreover, the requirement to be able to explain effective computability also accords with 
some key criteria for evaluating adequate accounts of concrete computation
24
. For instance, 
Brian Cantwell Smith’s (2002: p. 24) conceptual criterion and Piccinini’s (2007: p. 504) ex-
planation criterion mandate that any such account ought to explain underlying computational 
concepts (for example, a compiler, an interpreter, an algorithm etc.) as well as how program 
execution relates to the general notion of digital computation. 
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 For a detailed analysis of the key criteria for evaluating the adequacy of accounts of computation see Fresco 
2008. 
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Secondly, any account of effective computability has to explain at least the three key algo-
rithmic notions of input, output and procedures. As Hao Wang put it “[w]hat is adequately ex-
plicated [by Turing computability] is the intuitive concept of mechanical procedures or algo-
rithms or computation procedures of  finite  combinatorial  procedures”  (Wang  1974:  p.  89). 
According to Turing (1936: pp. 231-232) a physical computing system has to recognise sym-
bols, write symbols and store them in memory, change states and follow instructions. Follow-
ing instructions amounts to the computing system acting in accordance with an algorithm. The 
operation of a UTM is explained by its execution of the instructions of some special purpose 
TM on input that was also inscribed on the UTM's tape.  
Even if we opted not to analyse concrete computation in terms of TMs, the fundamental 
notion of an algorithm would still require explication. Nachum Dershowitz and Yuri Gure-
vich, for instance, offer four postulates that allow a natural axiomatisation of computability 
(2008). Their analysis is not specific to any particular computational model, but it applies to 
arbitrary state-transition systems with arbitrary structures for states. It can also be generalised 
to encompass parallel interactive and parallel computations. At the heart of this analysis re-
mains the underlying notion of an algorithm, which is characterised by the first postulate as 
determining “a sequence of computational states  for each valid input” (ibid: p. 306). There-
fore, any account of concrete computation has to at least explain the key notions of input, 
output and following procedures. 
 4.2  An IP account based on SI or AI 
To start with, an IP account of concrete computation that is underpinned by SI has a limited 
explanatory power concerning effective computability. SI only makes sense in the context of a 
set of potential messages that are communicated between a sender and a receiver and a proba-
 30 
bility distribution over this set (Adriaans 2008: pp. 146-147). There is no room for a probabil-
istic selection of messages in describing deterministic procedures, for the probability is 1 (bar-
ring adverse effects of noise as discussed above). There must be a specific set of messages 
that are selected, encoded and transmitted in the same order in accordance with the specific 
steps of the procedure, regardless of the probabilities associated with each message (or its 
symbol constituents). 
 AI is an improvement on SI as a basis for an IP account of computation and does better in 
terms of explaining effective computability. AIT analyses the complexity of a string relative to 
a particular UTM as a single message and hides the probabilistic message selection process of 
SIT. AIT (and more specifically FSTAIT) can describe the behaviour of (optimal) programs 
(whilst industry computer programs are rarely ever optimal in the AIT sense). FSTAIT can 
describe the behaviour of non-optimal programs too, if the size of the program in bits is speci-
fied
25
. The resulting non-optimal programs then become enumerable and distinguishable from 
one another (as in the representative case of optimal programs) (Calude, personal communica-
tion).  
Moreover, as suggested above, the processing of SI or AI is problematic. The focus of SI 
is not on the content of individual messages, but that content is precisely what gets manipu-
lated. Processing SI can be the modification of the state or string states that may result in 
changes of the conditional entropies among the states. It can also be the elimination of possi-
bilities (reduction in uncertainty) represented by a signal or the introduction of redundancy to 
offset the impact of noise and equivocation. Still, sending the same message twice (as a means 
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 Dealing with optimal programs is a feature of (at least conventional) AIT. But this by no means has any special 
bearing on AIT being an adequate candidate for an IP account of digital computation. Rather, the point is that 
AIT, unlike SIT, can adequately describe the behaviour of different programs. 
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of introducing redundancy) does not yield more information than that in each
26
. Similarly, the 
elimination of redundancy does not reduce the underlying informational content. Importantly, 
whilst SI is viewed by many as having some potency as an instrument for creating order in 
complex systems, it is overrated (Corning 2001: p. 1274). Being insensitive to the content of 
individual messages renders the SI-based IP account incapable of distinguishing control in-
formation from other types of information. 
Furthermore, noise on the channel is the source of modification and removal of informa-
tion and uncertainty is the source of new information. Error correction methods are introduced 
as means of modifying information to offset that noise. But even then the underlying informa-
tional content of the messages remains (largely) unmodified
27
. And noise that causes the re-
moval of (some) information is typically physical and rarely ever deliberate. We constantly try 
to find new ways to minimise the adverse impact of noise on communication (e.g., by using 
parity check bits, Hamming code, etc.). The deletion of information in computing systems, in 
contrast, could be completely deliberate, say, to free up memory resources or reduce the size 
of a database. As well, new SI is produced only relative to the uncertainty associated with that 
information. If the entropy of a message in a particular context is 0, then sending this message 
will not amount to producing new information. 
 In like manner, questions about the processing of AI amount to problems of encoding in-
formation. Producing new information, for example, amounts to the system producing an out-
put string SOUTPUT that encodes more information than the input string SINPUT. For a compu-
                                                 
26
 It may be argued, however, that increasing the reliability of the message transmission process instills some 
confidence in the receiver. But even if that were the case, any “new” information here would remain constant 
and would not increase further by sending each message, say, three times (instead of two). 
27
 Strictly, by adding, say, parity bits to a message M1, the informational content in M1 plus the parity bits in-
creases over the informational content of just M1. But unless those parity bits play an additional role as well as 
an error correction method (e.g., for data security as well as data integrity), the underlying information content is 
still conveyed by M1. 
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ting system to be capable of producing new information it has to start with SINPUT and produce 
SOUTPUT with more information than SINPUT. The production of new information amounts to 
the AI complexity of SOUTPUT being greater than that of SINPUT. Calude argues that a conven-
tional digital computer can only produce limited new information upper bounded by a con-
stant (2009: pp. 84-85). To show that this is the case, we need to find a self-delimiting TM, 
which halts on infinitely many inputs and is capable of producing infinitely many outputs 
each of which has more information than its corresponding input. But no TM is capable of 
such performance. 
 Conversely, the deletion of information by a computing system amounts to the system 
starting with SINPUT and producing SOUTPUT with less information than SINPUT. However, in 
this context it is worth reprising the distinction between data and information. A datum is de-
fined in terms of uninterpreted variables that are distinct from one another in a domain that is 
left open to interpretation. So, a complete deletion of all data can only be achieved by the eli-
mination of all differences among uninterpreted variables
28
 (Floridi 2011: p. 85). A system 
that produces SOUTPUT with less information than SINPUT means that some unwanted informa-
tion is displaced.  
A simple example is a shift register that shifts in data entered as input bits and serially 
shifts out the last bit in the bit array. There are two modes of readout: destructive and non-
destructive. In the former mode, the original data presented as input are removed once they 
have been shifted out of the right-most bit. However, in the latter mode, by adding an extra 
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 Floridi illustrates this point by considering a page of a book written in some unknown language (2011: p. 85). 
We have all the data but no information, for we do not know their meaning. If we erased half the content of 
that page, we might say that we have halved the data as well. Suppose we keep erasing the content of that 
page until the page is blank. Yet, we are left with some data, since the presence of the blank page is still a da-
tum as long as it is different from a non-blank page. 
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circuit, bits that are shifted out of the register are fed back into the system and hence not lost. 
Still, in the data transformation process, (some) information carried by the data is removed. 
 A similar principle holds for a selective deletion of certain entries in the database. Once the 
place in the memory holding that data (of those database entries) is overwritten, the (original) 
information is deleted. For example, the string “birtdayh happy” may be deleted from the da-
tabase and be overwritten by “happy birthday”. These are typical scenarios in classical com-
puting systems. But they differ from the case of information dissemination within the compu-
ting system (e.g., when parts of the computer’s memory are compressed and copied from one 
register to another) decreasing  the  system’s  descriptive  complexity  over  time  by means  of 
self-organisation (i.e., by compressing and structuring unstructured information).  
However, strictly speaking, an IP account based on AI will have a limited capacity to ex-
plain cases in which information is deleted and/or modified whilst the overall information 
complexity does not decrease. Or put another way, the system starts with an input string SIN-
PUT encoding less than or equal to the information encoded by the output string SOUTPUT. Un-
less the particular UTM (or combination of finite state transducers) running the program is 
changed as a result of deletion of information, AIT cannot account for the deletion operation. 
Additionally, the focus of AIT is the size of the program producing a certain output, but it 
ignores other practical considerations. For example, the “choice of computer or of computer 
programming language is not too important” for AIT (Chaitin 2007: p. 212). Chaitin’s com-
puter-as-a-decoder metaphor is useful to understanding what is computed, but not necessarily 
to how it is computed (when the AI complexity cannot be computed). FSTAIT allows us to 
also understand what is computed for optimal programs (since AI complexity is computable). 
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 It seems then that finite state transducer AI is a better candidate than classic AI for an IP 
account of computation, but both still face problems. The underlying physical architecture of 
the computing system and the supported instructions are also specified and implicitly included 
in the calculation of AI complexity. Although the universality theorem does not hold for 
FSTAIT, the invariance theorem does. No physical computing system is a genuine implemen-
tation of a UTM (for Turing’s unbounded memory requirement is violated), whereas compu-
ting systems can indeed be explained by the right combination of finite state transducers. Yet, 
both (conventional) AIT and FSTAIT deal with idealised computation. They deal with what 
happens between input and output whilst assuming faultless computation (Calude, personal 
communication). Any possible errors during the actual computation are ignored. AIT is based 
on idealised UTMs and (similarly) FSTAIT is based on faultless transducers.  
 4.3  An IP Account based on factual information 
Arguably, when information is interpreted as factual information it has to yield knowledge 
(Dretske 1981: pp. 45-47, Dunn 2008: p. 581, Floridi 2008: p. 118). That also implies a fur-
ther requirement for the resulting IP account, namely that by processing information the com-
puting system has to yield knowledge. This knowledge is either derived by its user (or pro-
grammer or interpreter) or intrinsic to the system. Plato defined knowledge as a true justified 
belief (which was widely accepted in modern philosophy
29
). Factual information must tell us 
something true about some state of affairs, that is, yield knowledge. One unproblematic op-
tion is that this knowledge is derivative and is used by the knower, who interprets the infor-
mation produced by the computing system. Another option is that this knowledge is intrinsic 
to the computing system itself.  
                                                 
29
 Edmund Gettier (1963) has challenged  Plato’s  view  of  knowledge  as  Justified  True  Belief. He argued that 
truth, belief, and justification are not sufficient conditions for knowledge. He showed that a true belief might 
be justified, but fail to be knowledge. 
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 The latter option has been challenged by many philosophers (Agassi 1988, 2003: pp. 
601-602; Dretske 1993; Dreyfus 1979; Harnad 1990; Penrose 1989: pp. 531-532; Searle 
1980) and it is not at all clear that there is compelling evidence to support it. There is only a 
limited sense in which a digital computing system “understands” or “knows” anything. A digi-
tal computer only “understands” single machine instructions (or multiple machine instructions 
simultaneously in the case of parallel computation) well enough to execute them. The CPU’s 
“know-how” requires no (propositional) knowledge of what the primitive ADD operation is. 
The CPU just needs to follow the opcode direction of the ADD operation to its physical ad-
dress and place some specified bits on the input lines of a logic circuit. 
The semantics of these machine instructions can be traced back from the higher level pro-
gramming language (i.e., the particular problem solved by the executed program) through as-
sembly language to the physical operation of the logic gates. The semantics of programming 
languages is formal and describes the relation between symbols in a computer language and 
their specific machine implementation. This formal semantics provides an abstract definition 
of the internal state of the computer and interprets the primitives of the programming lan-
guage as actions on this state. A high level language, such as C++ or Java, describes the com-
puter’s state at a high level of abstraction referring to data structures and operations on them. 
A low level language, such as C or assembler, describes labelled (relative) memory addresses 
and operations on them (White 2011: p. 194). 
Moreover, at the program level, any factual information entered by the user is converted 
into something recognisable by the computing system by using an implicit semantics dictio-
nary. This dictionary is used to translate factual information into some data structure that is 
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recognisable by the program
30
. This program is then translated (either at runtime or at compi-
lation time) into machine code that is executed (roughly speaking) on the machine hardware. 
At the hardware level, the working of the computing system is purely physical and is go-
verned by laws of physics. Fundamentally, electrons flow through the system’s logic gates. 
Still, whatever goes on at this level is completely determined by the programmed instructions 
and any input entered. The only semantics that exists at this level is internal to the computing 
system (e.g., instructions in certain memory addresses to be executed by the CPU, using cer-
tain registers for performing an addition operation and so on). 
 But it does not follow that the computer manifests any beliefs that are associated with these 
operations. Suppose we replace a doorbell with a digital computer that emits the sounds: 
“someone is at the door”, only when someone pushes the door button. When someone pushes 
the button, the computer picks up the information about it, processes it and delivers an output. 
However, this output is not a belief that someone is at the door, anymore than the doorbell 
would have believed that (Dretske 1981: p. 204). Roy Sorensen (2007: pp. 158-179) distin-
guishes between information conveyed by assertions and displays. When a computer weather 
program displays a rainy weather forecast for tomorrow, it does not believe that it will rain 
tomorrow (though this output may be based on a reliable source of information). There is no 
relevant intrinsic belief or knowledge in these systems. 
Moreover, digital computation will proceed (or not) regardless of the truth-value of the in-
formation processed by the computing system. Gricean non-natural meaning of signs (e.g., 
three dings of the bus bell indicating that the bus is full) does not require a correspondence to 
the state of affairs in question (e.g., whether the bus is actually full). Likewise, consider for 
                                                 
30
 The ace of hearts card, for instance, is represented as a data structure with properties such as a shape, a number 
etc. This data structure can be processed by the program and when appropriate, the processed data can be 
presented again in some form of human readable information as output. 
 37 
example, a conventional computing system that was programmed with (or a neural net trained 
on) certain axioms and rules for inferring new propositions from old ones. This system may 
produce a particular output that corresponds to some state of affairs in world X.  
However, if the same system were operating in another possible world Y (somewhat differ-
ent from world X), it would still give the same output (assuming that the same input and that 
the initial state remains unchanged). But its output in world Y may not be true anymore. As 
far as deterministic computation goes, the future of the computational process is completely 
predictable from the very beginning in any possible world (save for some possible miscompu-
tation).  
Still, the information processed by the computing system need not correspond to an exter-
nal state of affairs. Even if we took the input and the initial state as an external state of affairs 
(in the sense that they are set from outside the computing system), this would be the “point of 
departure” for the program execution. The program would proceed without necessarily pre-
serving any correspondence to the relevant external state of affairs. Indeed, programs consist 
of well-formed data that are meaningful relative to the particular programming language. 
Therefore, they satisfy the principles of the common analysis of semantic information above 
and can be described as semantic information (sans truth-value) (Larsson and Lüders 2004: p. 
5). The program can only be described as factual information if it happens to correspond to 
actual state of affairs. But whether a computation represents some state of affairs or not is a 
contingent fact. 
 5  A Plausible IP Account of Computation 
Instructional information remains a plausible candidate for an IP account of computation. It is 
not susceptible to the problems that the other three interpretations of information face as can-
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didates for an IP account. Instructional information cannot be characterised alethically as fac-
tual information. Also, it does better than SI and AI in terms of explaining computational pro-
cedures. Imperative (instructional) information is needed for explaining the default control 
structure that simply amounts to a sequential execution of instructions, such as finding the 
solution(s) of the algebraic equation ax
2
 + bx + c = 0. Conditional information is needed for 
explaining conditional branching by allowing the program to follow alternative paths of ex-
ecution by using If X Then Y or If X Then Y Else Z structures (where Y and Z are instructions). 
It can also be used to explain looping over a certain operation (Do Y While X). Combined to-
gether these two types of instructional information suffice to explain the operation of any Tur-
ing computable procedure. 
 Furthermore, an Instructional Information Processing (IIP) account of computation is not 
limited to the program or algorithmic level. Conventional digital computers can also be ex-
plained in terms of IIP at the hardware level. But even the hardware level that is traditionally 
viewed as a single level can be further decomposed into several sublevels
31
. The following 
hierarchical decomposition shows how they differ and are underpinned by the lower levels. 
‚ Functional level – the operation of the computing system is analysed in terms of the 
function being computed in the process of the underlying registers changing their 
stored values. At this level of abstraction, an IIP analysis is applicable in a similar way 
to the algorithmic level. 
‚ Register Transfer level (a technology-specific analysis) – the operation of the compu-
ting system is analysed in terms of the registers changing their stored values. 
                                                 
31
 I owe this point to Karl-Christian Posch who suggested viewing these different levels of abstraction from an 
engineering perspective. 
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‚ Logical level – the operation of the computing system is analysed in terms of logic 
gates operating on various input lines. At this level of abstraction, it is easiest to see 
how these operations can be explained in terms of IIP of 0’s and 1’s. 
‚ Electrical level (a technology-specific analysis) – the operation of the computing sys-
tem is analysed in terms of electrical voltages, electro-mechanical operations etc. 
‚ Physical level – the operation of the computing system is analysed in terms of atomic 
or molecular movements. 
Viewed as a program-driven system
32
, an IIP analysis of a digital computer may be de-
scribed as a continuous interaction among a scanner, an interpreter and an operator. Firstly, 
the scanner is responsible for reading an atomic instruction, encoding it as a message and 
sending the message to an interpreter. It can be thought of as the computing system's “head”, 
which scans the lines of the program sequentially and transmits each atomic instruction as a 
message. Secondly, the interpreter receives a message, decodes and interprets it and then 
sends an encoded message (or messages) to the operator. There is no reason to assume a sin-
gle interpreter, and indeed in some cases many interpreters could be at work.  
Thirdly, the operator is the low level “worker” that fetches (and stores) information from 
(and in) short-term or long-term memory as well as sends commands for execution by the 
control unit (which actualises any control information). It is also likely that there would be 
multiple operators based on the various primitive operations, which are supported by the sys-
tem's physical architecture. The scanner, interpreter and operator all play a dual role of both a 
source and destination depending on the particular operation in progress. 
 Consider the following pseudo-code procedure for multiplying two natural numbers. 
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 Consequently, a special purpose TM would require some modification of the proposed analysis, if we chose 
not to interpret it as executing a program, per se. 
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procedure integer InefficientMutiply (integer multiplicand, integer multiplier){ 
integer multiplicationResult = 0; 
if (multiplicand ≤ 0) return 0; // illegal input results in termination 
while (multiplier > 0) do { 
multiplicationResult = multiplicationResult + multiplicand; 
multiplier = multiplier – 1; 
} 
return multiplicationResult; } 
According to the proposed analysis above, the first few runtime iterations of this procedure 
will  be  processed  in  the  following  manner.  The  procedure  is  called  with  ‘3’  as  the 
multiplicand  input  argument  and  ‘4’  as  the  multiplier  input  argument.  The  first  three 
instructions are illustrated below
33
. 
Figure 1. First instruction call: invoking the procedure InefficientMultiply (3, 4) using imperative information 
                                                 
33 Many intermediate steps have been removed for simplicity. For example, the name of the procedure “Ineffi-
cientMultiply” in figure 1 is not added to the call stack (as it should be) allowing its retrieval at a later stage. 
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Figure 2. Second instruction call: multiplicationResult = 0 using imperative information 
Figure 3. Third instruction call: if (multiplicand ≤ 0) using conditional information 
Although the examples above correspond to imperative, sequential programming, they ap-
ply equally well to other models too, such as the functional programming paradigm inspired 
by the lambda calculus. Whereas my examples illustrate computation in terms of sequences of 
instructions that change the program’s (and machine’s) state, the functional programming pa-
radigm treats computation as a sequence of stateless function evaluation. One example of the 
functional programming paradigm is the PCF language used for game models. PCF is an ap-
plied, simply-typed lambda calculus that is built from a certain stock of constants, including 
first-order constants concerned with arithmetic manipulation and conditional branching (Ab-
ramsky et al 2000: p. 430). 
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More specifically, these game models are thought of as a series of moves between a player 
and an opponent (or a system and the environment) that may be finite or infinite. Each move 
by the player or its opponent is either a question or an answer. Questions are considered re-
quests for input and answers are considered input or data (ibid: p. 414). The games are de-
fined with global rules. These rules ensure, for instance, that computations evolve in a proper-
ly nested fashion. This exhibits a key structural feature of functional computation, what Ab-
ramsky et al refer to as the “switching condition” on pairs of successive moves (ibid: p. 417), 
that is essentially based on conditional branching.  
Whilst functional programming (and computer game models) offers a different paradigm 
of digital computation, it can still be explained by the IIP analysis above. Such an analysis 
will have to explain the interactive approach of game models (being constantly driven by in-
put requests and corresponding inputs) and the nesting of functions. But in principle, there is 
nothing crucially different in this paradigm that makes the IIP analysis inapplicable. The nest-
ing of functions certainly exists in imperative programming as well (requiring additional 
communication between the interpreter and the operator). 
Lastly, this proposed IIP analysis is suggestive and still requires some fine-tuning and sev-
eral questions remain unanswered, to name just a few: 
1. How does the scanner select the interpreter to use if the relation between them is not a 
one-to-one relationship, but rather a one-to-many relation? 
2. This proposed analysis cuts across different levels of abstraction where the first two 
(scanner and interpreter) operate at the program level and the last one (the operator) oper-
ates at the machine level. Does it present a methodological problem for the IIP analysis? 
3. How does the operator work at the relevant physical level discussed above? 
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 6  The IIP Account Revisited 
Importantly, while strictly SI-based or AI-based IP accounts are insufficient to explain con-
crete computation, they are systematically related to instructional information, which I argue 
is a plausible candidate for an IP account. SI is instrumental for the analysis of information 
flow in computer programs. For instance, when applying SIT to analyse security threats in 
computer programs, quantitative concepts such as ‘entropy’, ‘channel capacity’ and ‘bit rates’ 
become extremely useful. Pasquale Malacaria (2007) examines the maximum amount of lea-
kage of loop constructs as a function of a potential attacker’s knowledge of the program’s in-
put (on the basis of entropy) and the amount of information leaked as a function of the num-
ber of loop iterations (in terms of bit rates). 
 This program-security quantitative analysis exhibits a systematic relation between SI and 
instructional information. On the one hand, we measure how much confidential information is 
leaked to the potential attacker by the output of the program. The program is treated then as a 
black box and its output (that is visible to the attacker) is analysed in terms of SIT to quantify 
the information leakage. On the other hand, this analysis is based on the internal structure of 
the program, which leaks information. This internal structure is analysed in terms of instruc-
tional information (such as the system’s states, relevant variables and loops or conditionals). 
 Moreover, AIT is inherently based on the qualitative notion of instructional information. 
AIT measures quantities of information in terms of the computational resources that are 
needed to specify it, viz., the program and the UTM (or finite state transducer, etc.) running it. 
This quantitative analysis is only possible when it is based on some basic set of instructions 
from which the program is composed. Otherwise, it would not be possible to measure the 
length of any optimal program for computing a particular string. AI complexity essentially 
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depends on the number of instructions the program performs on a given input (if any), the 
computational capacity of the particular programming language used (i.e., what basic instruc-
tions are supported) and the size of the program in characters (Calude 1988: p. 383). 
Current AIT also requires that programs will be self-delimited so that their overall length 
can be calculated. And indeed programming languages are designed with that property in 
mind. There are always clear start and end points to every program and its procedures (e.g., in 
some languages a semicolon is used as an end-marker,  in  others  the  words  ‘BEGIN’  and 
‘END’ are used). Whether we choose to measure program-size in C, Fortran or LISP, the AI 
complexity analysis depends on the internal structure of the program in question. For in-
stance, Calude uses a universal language that has seven basic instructions (plus input and out-
put) and claims that this repertoire of instructions suffices for the creation of algorithms to 
solve all Turing-computable functions (1988: pp. 384, 402). These seven instructions are As-
signment, Set  to zero, Successor, Conditional, Loop, END and  ‘;’. The  internal  structure of 
the program is plainly based on instructional information. 
Finally, let us now examine several problems that were raised above in regard to an IP ac-
count of computation to determine their applicability to the IIP account. 
‚ Is false information the same as a miscomputation? 
Since, unlike factual information, instructional information is not characterised alethically, 
this problem can be sidestepped. 
‚ What constitutes the production, modification and removal of instructional information? 
Processing instructional information simply amounts to the execution of instructions plus 
(possibly) some input. If the computing system is instructed to populate the database with sal-
aries of employees, it will do so while producing new information in the process. If a certain 
 45 
condition is met (say employees with more than 5 years seniority), the salaries of some em-
ployees will be updated (e.g., given a 10% a payrise) while modifying information (e.g., if E > 
5, then S = S x 1.1). The removal of (some) information could simply be a deliberate deletion 
of some records from the database (when the employees have left the company), rather than 
being the result of noise that physically damages the database and deletes some records as a 
result (as in the case of processing SI, for instance). 
‚ Does processing of instructional information have to be truth preserving? 
Again, since, unlike factual information, instructional information is not characterised as 
true or false, processed information need not be truth preserving per se. Truth has to be pre-
served simply in a Boolean-algebraic sense. Say, if the condition (does X equal 0) is evaluated 
as true at T1, then it should also be evaluated as true at T2, assuming that the value of X has 
not changed between T1 and T2. 
‚ Can the IIP account explain concrete computation as a function of the particular pro-
gramming language used and the underlying physical architecture of the computing sys-
tem? 
Yes. Depending on the particular programming language, conditional information could 
give rise to different constructs of conditional branching such as loops, recursive procedure 
calls, goto statements etc. Imperative information is the basis for the assignment of values to 
variables  (e.g., X=5, Str=’this  is  a  string’,  INSERT  INTO employees_table (first name, last 
name, role, department, start date) VALUES (Michael, Smith, Team_Leader, IT_Security, 
1.1.2008), etc.). Further, the underlying physical architecture of the computing system affects 
the manner in which information is processed. The instruction (if x+y equals 10) would be 
evaluated differently at the machine level, if the architecture did not support the addition op-
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eration directly on  the  computer’s memory banks. The information will be processed diffe-
rently at the level of the register transfer, for instance. More transfer operations between regis-
ters would be needed to calculate (x+y) before the register value can be compared with 10. 
‚ Can the IIP account explain the key algorithmic notions of input, output and procedures? 
Yes, instructional information is compatible with the key notion of procedures by defini-
tion. Procedures are sequences of instructions that are either imperative (e.g., assigning values 
to variables, accepting input, printing output, etc.) or conditional. These are exactly the two 
existing types of instructional information. 
‚ Can the IIP account explain the digital computation performed by discrete neural nets? 
This question presupposes that (non-simulated) discrete neural nets are genuinely digital 
computing systems. This is debatable and not immediately clear. But if they were indeed 
computational, the answer would crucially depend on whether the right way to explain their 
operation is algorithmic or not. This debate is unsettled. 
 7  Conclusion 
Although an IP account, on the face of it, seems like a natural and promising candidate for 
explaining concrete digital computation, it is not as obvious as it first seems. Its explanatory 
power depends on what we take ‘information’ to be. I have argued that the capacity to actual-
ise control information is essential for individuating digital computing systems proper. And 
whilst algorithmic information fares much better than Shannon information as a candidate for 
a plausible IP account of concrete computation, the resulting account still faces problems. The 
most adequate candidate for an IP account is instructional information, for it is compatible 
with control information and avoids most of the problems faced by other interpretations of 
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information. An interesting question is whether discrete neural nets can be fully explained by 
such an IP account. But this remains to be seen. 
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